We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between a pair of mutually altruistic siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty and the siblings may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism and depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary robustness of degrees of sibling altruism, and show that this degree is less than one half, the kinship relatedness factor. By way of numerical simulations we show that family ties are weaker in harsher environments.
Introduction
As much as economists cherish the assumption that individuals are sel…sh, altruistic behavior, such as gift giving, material assistance, and cooperation in social-dilemma-like situations, is common. While such behavior may arise as an equilibrium outcome in an inde…nitely repeated interaction between sel…sh individuals many economists, including Edgeworth (1881) and Becker (1974) , have theorized that altruism exists. Most people would probably also …nd, by introspection, that they are willing to sometimes help others, even with no prospect of future rewards. Not surprisingly, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has developed to investigate how altruism a¤ects economic outcomes and how altruistic behaviors are sustained.
1 In this paper we shed new light on both questions, with a focus on family ties.
Numerous empirical studies show that private transfers are more common within the family than between unrelated households, 2 and that such transfers appear to function as a risk-sharing device. 3 Intuition suggests that high levels of informal risk sharing within the family are desirable. However, several researchers have o¤ered rather negative views of the family. Thus, Ban…eld (1958) thought that the "amoral familism" that he observed in certain parts of Italy was an impediment to economic development. In a similar spirit, Max Weber (1951) 1 For a recent collection of surveys see Kolm and Ythier (2006) 2 See Fafchamps (2008), and Lund (2003) .
3 Cox, Galasso and Jimenez (2006) show that the average income of donor households exceeds that of recipient households. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) …nd that shocks a¤ect transfers between Filipino rural households. Using data from Thailand, Miller and Paulson (1999) show that remittances respond to shocks to regional rainfall.
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to a large extent in opposition to the family. (p.237)"In his view, a strong sense of solidarity among members of the extended family, coupled with a hostile attitude towards strangers, promotes a culture where nepotism may thrive and counter the e¢ cient development of markets.
Motivated by evidence that family ties vary in strength across cultures, 4 we here pursue the line of thought suggested by Weber, by theoretically analyzing the e¤ects of family ties on risk-sharing and incentives. We address several questions, including: If family members with higher earnings give transfers to those with lower incomes (and are willing and expected to do so), what is the e¤ect of such family ties on incentives to exert productive e¤ort or make productive investments? What is the most e¢ cient level of informal risk sharing, if any? We are able to shed new light on these classical issues by allowing for mutual altruism and an endogenous risk-reducing e¤ort, where the literature has focused either on models with one-sided altruism, or on models with mutual altruism but without risk.
Furthermore, inspired by observations by Weber and others (see below) that family ties may have grown weaker in northwestern Europe prior to the industrial revolution, we ask whether the incentive e¤ect of family ties (in a society consisting mainly of subsistence farmers) depends on the exogenously given environment. 5 If so, may this have contributed to the development of relatively weak family ties in certain parts of the world? We formally address this question by determining evolutionarily robust degrees of altruism.
Our model is simple, but, we believe, canonical: two risk-averse siblings each choose a costly risk-reducing action, "e¤ort,"that determines the probability distribution over output levels. Once both siblings'outputs have been realized, each sibling chooses whether to share some of his or her output with the other. 6 We model the motive for intra-family transfers as altruism, modelled in the usual way as a positive weight placed on other family members'
4 Alesina and Giuliano (2007) use the World Values Survey to establish that family ties vary in strength among di¤erent countries. Evidence based on rates of cohabitation between parents and their adult children shows that such cohabitation is (on average ) viewed as an inferior good in the U.S. (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993 ), but as a normal good in Italy (Manacorda and Moretti, 2006) . 5 In a companion sequel paper, Alger and Weibull (2008) , we analyze these questions in a setting in which family transfers are socially coerced rather than, as here, voluntary, and there we also compare the outcomes with those in perfectly competitive insurance markets. 6 Other researchers have taken the risk as given and focussed on the enforceability of transfers within families; see, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993) , Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) , Genicot and Ray (2003) , and Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) .
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welfare. This particular game has not been studied before. Most of the literature on altruism, starting with Becker (1974) , assumes one-sided altruism (see also, e.g., Bruce and Waldman, 1990 , Chami, 1998 , and Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006 . In models with two-sided altruism, typically only one of the players chooses an e¤ort (see Laferrère and Wol¤, 2006 , for a recent survey), or there is no risk Weibull, 1988, and Chen and Woolley, 2001 ).
In the case of equally altruistic siblings, an increase in the common level of altruism leads to larger transfers, and thus a stronger free-rider e¤ect on e¤ort, but also to a stronger empathy-e¤ect on e¤ort, by which we mean the desire to be able to help one's sibling if need be. Which e¤ect dominates? It turns out that both e¤ects are absent when the common degree of altruism is low, that the free-rider e¤ect outweighs the empathy e¤ect when the common degree of altruism is of intermediate strength, and that the opposite holds when the common degree of altruism is strong. Despite the non-monotonicity of e¤ort, with respect to the common degree of altruism, siblings fare best, in terms of their expected material utility -utility from consumption and e¤ort -when they are fully altruistic towards each other (attaching the same weight to the other's material utility as to their own). In particular, their expected material utility is higher than if they had been completely sel…sh.
Although full altruism would lead to the (ex ante expected) Pareto e¢ cient outcome, full altruism is not what we observe in reality. 7 What level of intra-family altruism should one expect, from …rst principles? Here we follow in the footsteps of early proponents of evolutionary theory, including Darwin, who were puzzled by the occurrence of altruism in nature: how can a behavior or trait whereby the individual gives up resources for the bene…t of others survive? Since then, biologists have developed theories of altruism, such as kinship altruism (Haldane, 1955, and Hamilton, 1964a,b) , reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) , and multilevel selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998) . Our approach is closest to that of the British biologist William Hamilton (1964a,b) , and in a sense we generalize the so-called Hamilton's rule, much along the same line as proposed by Bergstrom (1995) . Hamilton's model, "which is particularly adapted to deal with interactions between relatives of the same generation" (Hamilton, 1964a, p.2) , predicts that evolutionary forces will select for a degree of altruism of approximately 1/2 between siblings. According to Hamilton "This means that for a hereditary tendency to perform an action [which is detrimental to individual …tness] of this 7 The large empirical literature on intra-family transfers was recently reviewed by Cox and Fafchamps (2008) . Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004), and Maitra and Ray (2003) …nd fairly strong evidence that transfers are driven by altruistic motives for low-income households, although there is no evidence that such altruism would be anywhere near full altruism.
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kind to evolve the bene…t to a sib must average at least twice the loss to the individual."(op.
cit., p.16). Such an action would be bene…cial to "inclusive …tness,"a notion introduced by
Hamilton in this article. This has become known as Hamilton's rule, and can be summarized as the condition that the action in question will be taken if and only if rb > c, where c is the reduction of the actor's …tness, b is the increase in the recipient's …tness, and r is Wright's coe¢ cient of relationship, a coe¢ cient that is 1/2 between siblings (Wright, 1922) .
When postulating his rule, Hamilton did not consider strategic aspects of the interaction between kin. Ted Bergstrom (1995 Bergstrom ( , 2003 ) enriched Hamilton's kinship selection theory by allowing for precisely such aspects. Inspired by Bergstrom's (1995 Bergstrom's ( , 2003 approach, we develop a notion of local evolutionary robustness and apply this to the above-mentioned pairwise sibling interaction. We show that neither complete sel…shness (no concern for one's sibling), nor full altruism (equal concern for one's sibling as for oneself) is locally evolutionarily robust in any environment. In the light of Hamilton's rule, at …rst sight one might conjecture the locally evolutionarily robust degree of altruism to equal one-half, the coe¢ cient of relationship between the siblings. This would indeed be true in our model, had e¤ort levels been exogeneously …xed. However, we show that the strategic aspects that endogeneously determine the siblings' e¤orts pushes the locally evolutionarily robust degree of altruism down, to a level below 1/2, and that it depends on the harshness of the environment. An individual with sibling altruism 1/2 can be exploited by a more sel…sh "mutant" sibling, and this tendency is stronger in harsher climates. As a result, family ties should be expected to be weaker in harsher environments (or climates) than in milder ones. This theoretical …nding seems to be consistent with empirical observations that family ties grew weaker in the harsh northwestern Europe prior to the industrial revolution (see Section 6). Returning to Weber's observation that Protestantism "shattered the fetters of the sib:" if altruism is lower in the (usually harsher) climates of Protestant countries, then Protestantism need not be the cause for weaker family ties, but the result of harsher climates -chosen as a moral code for the looser family ties that typically prevail in harsh climates.
Indeed, some historians share the view that early Protestantism arose predominantly in areas where traditional social norms and social expectations were at odds with the rules imposed by Rome (see e.g. Ozment, 1974 Ozment, , 1992 .
We are not aware of any work leading to these predictions. The closest is probably Bergstrom (1995) , mentioned above, who notes that a population consisting of individuals who discount the …tness bene…t bestowed on their siblings by one half would not resist an invasion by mutants with a di¤erent discount factor (degree of altruism). Our base model is close to that by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) . They model "family insurance" as transfers within pairs of ex ante identical individuals and they allow for an endogenous, risk-reducing e¤ort taken by these individuals. However, whereas in our model transfers within the family are driven by altruism, in their model family transfers are the outcome of a joint agreement. In particular, if family members can observe each other's e¤ort, the joint agreement in their model speci…es that total family income should always be split equally and (in the case of observable e¤ort) the agreement speci…es the e¤ort to be taken. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the special case in our model of maximal family altruism (when members attach the same utility weight to other's welfare as to their own).
Moreover, they address a di¤erent question. They ask whether, in the presence of insurance markets, supplemental informal insurance within the family improves welfare.
The topic we address here is also related to that in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) , who analyze altruistic parents'incentive to instill a work norm in their children. The incentive stems from parents' inability to commit not to help their children if in …nancial need. If the children feel a strong social norm to work hard, then this reduces the risk that the children will be in need, which is good for the altruistic parents. They focus on parent-child interactions and do not carry out an evolutionary stability analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the model, beginning with the case of a sel…sh atomistic individual and then introducing family ties in terms of a two-stage game between two mutually altruistic siblings. In section 3
we characterize equilibria, and we conduct comparative-statics analyses of the equilibrium outcome. In Section 4 we develop a notion of evolutionary robustness of family ties and apply this to our model. Section 5 brie ‡y discusses evidence on family ties, and Section 6 concludes. All mathematical proofs have been relegated to an appendix.
2 The model
Atomistic and sel…sh individuals
Consider an individual who feels no wish or social pressure to help others, living in an environment where insurance is not available. The individual chooses an e¤ort level x 2 R + that determines the probability distribution over the possible returns, or output levels. The output is either high, y H , or low, y L = y H , where < 1 is the factor by which output is reduced in the "bad" outcome. As such, represents output variability. With probability 2 [0; 1) an exogenous hazard, such as a natural catastrophe, leads the output to being low; the parameter may also be interpreted as institutional quality, e.g., the probability with which private property will be con…scated. When this hazard does not strike, the output is high with probability p and low with probability 1 p. The probability p 2 [0; 1] for the high output level (when the exogenous hazard does not strike) is increasing (at a decreasing rate)
in the individual's e¤ort, p = ' ( x), where ' : R + ! [0; 1) is continuously di¤erentiable with
The parameter > 0 represents the ease with which e¤ort increases the probability of the high output: a higher implies that the e¤ort required to achieve a given success probability p is smaller: x = ' 1 (p) = . A higher may thus represent an easier environment, more skillful individuals and/or technological progress. We will refer to as the e¤ort return parameter. Note that, by assumption, p = ' ( x) < 1 for all and x. In other words: it is impossible for any inidividual in any environment to obtain the high output level for sure.
Since the low output level is achieved without any e¤ort, this is the output that nature provides "for free."By contrast, the high output level is the best that can be achieved with e¤ort. In most of our comparative statics analyses, we will keep the high output level, y H = Y > 0, …xed while the three other "environmental"parameters, , , and , vary. We will usually refer to the triplet ( ; ; ) as the environment. We will say that an environment
the marginal return to e¤ort is smaller ( 0 ), and/or the probability of the exogenous hazard is higher ( 0 ), with at least one strict inequality.
In a given environment, an e¤ort level x 0 results in the expected utility Alternatively, if the individual chooses his or her success probability p, at a cost or disutility (p), the expected utility can be written as
where u is de…ned as above and can be derived from v and ' as follows:
The previous assumptions on v and ' imply that, for any given > 0 the disutility of maintaining a success probability p is increasing and strictly convex in p: 0 0 and 00 > 0, with 0 (p) = 0 if and only if p = 0, and 0 (p) ! +1 as p ! 1. The optimal success probability p 2 (0; 1) is uniquely determined by the …rst-order condition
which simply requires that the marginal disutility of increasing the success probability should equal the marginal bene…t thereof. We note that the success probability de…ned by (3) is higher the higher is the variability of the environment, and, when translating the model speci…cation back to the e¤ort-based model, the higher is the marginal return to e¤ort . In the sequel we will use this model verions and let x 0 , p 0 , y 0 , and V 0 denote the e¤ort, success probability, expected income, and expected utility of an atomistic and sel…sh individual. 
Individuals with family ties
where j 6 = i. Here V i is sibling i's material utility,
and i 2 [0; 1] represents i's degree of altruism of i towards his or her sibling. 10 An individual i with i = 0 will be called sel…sh and an individual with i = 1 fully altruistic. We solve this two-stage game G by backward induction. Since all four states ! are reached with positive probability under any strategy pro…le, all Nash equilibria are also sequential equilibria.
Equilibrium
In each state ! 2 at the beginning of the second stage, each sibling i wants to make a transfer to the other if and only if his own marginal material utility from consumption is lower 9 As will be seen later, our results are unchanged if the siblings also observe each other's e¤orts.
10 For i j < 1, Equation (4) can be shown to be equivalent with U i being proportional to V i (s;!) + i U j for i = A; B, and j 6 = i. Hence, for such parameter combinations, the current formulation is consistent with "pure" (or "non-paternalistic") altruism; see Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) .
9
than his sibling's, when the latter is weighted by i's degree of altruism. In order to make his transfer decision, individual i also has to …gure out whether the sibling is simultaneously planning to give a transfer to him. All that matters to each sibling is the net transfer to the other. It is straightforward to prove that, except for the case when both individuals are fully altruistic, in equilibrium at most one sibling makes a transfer, and this transfer is uniquely determined. Should both siblings be fully altruistic ( A = B = 1), the transfers are not uniquely determined, but the resulting allocation is uniquely determined. For each state ! 2 , let G(!) be the continuation game from the beginning of stage two on, a two-player simultaneous-move game in which each player's strategy is his or her transfer to the other player.
Proposition 1 For each ! 2 , there exists at least one Nash equilibrium of G(!). If A B < 1, then this equilibrium is unique and at most one sibling makes a transfer. A transfer is never made from a poorer to a richer sibling, and the size of the transfer does not depend on the poorer sibling's degree of altruism. If A = B = 1, then there is a continuum of Nash equilibria, all resulting in equal sharing of the total output.
(Proof in the Appendix.) Let us spell this out in some detail. A positive equilibrium transfer is hence made by a "rich"sibling -a sibling with the high output Y -to a "poor" sibling -a sibling with the low output Y . Let t ( ) denote the transfer that a rich sibling with altruism gives in equilibrium to his or her poor sibling (whose degree of altruism then does not matter). It follows from our assumptions that the transfer given is positive if and only if the rich sibling is su¢ ciently altruistic in the sense that u
equivalently, if and only if >^ ( ), wherê
For each >^ ( ), the transfer t 2 (0; Y ) is uniquely determined by the …rst-order condition
In sum: the transfer T ( ) that a rich sibling with altruism 2 [0; 1] makes to his or her poor sibling is
where t is de…ned by (6).
10
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We note that the equilibrium transfer function T :
if >^ ( ), and zero otherwise. Moreover, T is di¤erentiable for all 6 =^ ( ), with
for all >^ ( ). Hence, as one would expect, a rich sibling's transfer to his or her poor sibling is strictly increasing in the rich sibling's degree of altruism, for all degrees of altruism above its critical lower bound for a transfer to occur,^ ( ).
The following simple observations turn out to be useful for the subsequent analysis. First, a rich sibling with altruism 2 (^ ( ) ; 1) always remains richer than his or her poor sibling also after the transfer:
When = 1, total output is shared equally:
Secondly, for a given level of altruism >^ ( ) and high-output level Y > 0, the equilibrium transfer is increasing in output variability: the higher is (and therefore, the higher the low output Y is), the smaller is T ( ). However, an increase in (lowered variability) is not fully o¤set by the decrease in the transfer: it leads to strictly higher consumption levels for both siblings in the two states in which one sibling is rich and the other poor. Formally:
Remark 1 It is easily veri…ed that the equilibrium transfers would have been the same, had the siblings observed each others'e¤ort. This follows from the assumed additive separability of material utility, see equation (2).
Turning to the …rst period, in which the siblings simultaneously choose their individual success-probabilities (or, equivalently, e¤orts), they both anticipate the subsequent transfers 11 In a model with an altruistic parent and a sel…sh child, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤ (1997) showed that an increase in the child's income by $1 would lead to a decrease of $1 in the parent's transfer to the child. This result was derived in a model where the parent makes transfers to the child in two subsequent periods, and it hinges on the assumption that the child is liquidity constrained in the …rst period. Hence, proposition 2 is not in contradiction with their result.
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for i = A; B and j 6 = i. The four …rst terms represent the distinct second-period states:
both being rich, both being poor, i rich and j poor, and i poor and j rich (for i = A; B and j 6 = i). The last two terms represent the two siblings'disutility from e¤ort.
The pair (U A ; U B ) de…nes the (di¤erentiable) payo¤ functions in a two-player normalform game G in which a pure strategy for each player i is his or her success probability p i 2 (0; 1). Each Nash equilibrium of the reduced-form game G induces a Nash equilibrium of G, and vice versa. Without loss of generality, we may hence focus on the Nash equilibria of G .
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a strategy pair (p A ; p B ) 2 (0; 1) 2 to constitute a Nash equilibrium is that it satisfy the following generalization of the optimality condition for the autarky case:
where, for any p; ; 2 [0; 1]:
Just as in the autarky case (equation (3)), the equation system (10) requires that the marginal cost of increasing one's success probability (or e¤ort) should equal the expected marginal bene…t thereof.
Compared to the autarky case, here the marginal bene…t has a composite additional term, given by the expression for g (p; ; ) given in (11). First, increasing one's success probability increases the probability of being able to help one's sibling, should the sibling become poor. This is the …rst term in the expression for g (p; ; ). Second, increasing one's success probability decreases the probability of being helped out by one's sibling, should the sibling become rich. This is the second term.
The right-hand sides in the equation system (10) are decreasing a¢ ne functions of the other sibling's success probability. Hence, the higher one's sibling's success probability, the weaker is the incentive to increase one's own success probability. This disincentive e¤ect can be decomposed into two components: when i's sibling's success probability (e¤ort) increases, then (a) the probability that i will be put in a position to help, if successful, decreases, and (b) the probability of being helped out if unsuccessful increases. We saw previously that the transfer from a rich to a poor sibling is increasing in the level of altruism of the rich sibling. Will a higher level of altruism therefore lead to lower levels of e¤ort, as suggested by well-known results on moral hazard and insurance?
To answer this question, we …rst ask how changes in the individual degrees of altruism would a¤ect the equilibrium e¤orts. Thus, consider an increase in sibling i's altruism: this has only one e¤ect on the transfers, namely, that sibling i would make a larger transfer to his sibling j should i be rich and j poor. Clearly, this should reduce j's incentive to provide e¤ort. But how about sibling i? Sibling i gets to keep less if he is rich and the other poor-intuitively this should have a negative impact on i's e¤ort. However, sibling i now also cares more about j, and this should have a positive impact. It turns out that the latter, positive e¤ect always outweighs the former, negative e¤ect. This claim can be made precise if the Jacobian of the equation system (10) is non-null, a condition that guarantees local uniqueness of the equilibrium in question.
Proposition 3 Consider a Nash equilibrium (p
If (12) holds and i >^ ( ), then a marginal increase in i causes an increase in p i and a decrease in p j (for i 2 fA; Bg and j 6 = i).
The intuition behind the proof given in the appendix is straightforward: if some transfer is given with positive probability along the equilibrium path, then an individual's best reply to any success probability that his or her sibling may choose is increasing in the individual's own altruism, ceteris paribus. The motive is twofold: …rst, to increase the chance to have 13 something to give in case one's sibling obtains the low output, and, secondly, to decrease the risk that one's sibling will need to give a transfer.
13
In sum, a more altruistic individual not only gives a larger transfer, but also chooses a higher probability of obtaining the high output level. We call this positive e¤ect of altruism the empathy e¤ect (from own altruism). By contrast, an individual may choose a lower success probability if the sibling's altruism increases, ceteris paribus. This is the well-known free-riding e¤ect of others' altruism (here: one's sibling's). If both siblings become more altruistic, will the empathy or free-riding e¤ect dominate? We answer this question for the case of equally altruistic siblings.
Equally altruistic siblings
Consider a pair of siblings with the same degree of altruism: A = B = . The game G then has a unique symmetric equilibrium (p ; p ), where p 2 (0; 1) solves the following equation, obtained from (10):
We …rst consider a parametric example. 13 Transfers are voluntary, but it is better for a sibling to be in a state in which both siblings receive the high output.
14 To see that the symmetric equilibrium is unique, note that, by hypothesis, the left-hand side is continuous and increasing from zero to plus in…nity, while the right-hand side is a decreasing a¢ ne function with positive intercept. The latter property becomes transparent after some algebraic manipulation: equation (14) can be written in the simple form
for
where a; b > 0. That a is positive follows from our earlier observation that a donor remains richer than the
That b is positive follows from the concavity of u, implying that the recipient's material utility increases more from the transfer than the donor's material utility decreases.
Example
Let the success probability be an exponential function of e¤ort, ' ( x) = 1 e x for > 0, and let material utility be log-linear in consumption and e¤ort: u(y) v (x) = ln y x for > 0, a parameter that represents the individual's distaste for e¤ort. The expected material utility in autarky, written as a function of the success probability p, is then
From (6) and (7) we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium transfer from a rich individual with altruism 2 (0; 1) to her poor sibling:
We note that this transfer is independent of the parameters and and that it is increasing in , from zero for all <^ ( ) , towards (1 ) Y =2 as ! 1.
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The …rst-order condition (14) for the success probability boils down to
For given parameter values, the left-hand side is a polynomial of degree two in p, with paremeters , and , while the right-hand side is a constant, the ratio between the distaste for e¤ort and the return to e¤ort. Figure 1 plots its solution, the equilibrium success probability p ( ) for = = 0:5 and = 0, for = 0:3 (the upper curve) and for = 0:4 (the lower curve). When altruism is weak ( ), the siblings expect no transfers from each other and therefore choose the autarky e¤ort. As increases beyond , each sibling expects to give (receive) a transfer, should he become rich (poor) and the other sibling poor (rich).
We note that the equilibrium success probability (or, equivalently, e¤ort) is non-monotonic in altruism. We also note that in the harsher environment, = 0:3, the equilibrium e¤ort is higher for relatively sel…sh individuals ( ) than for relatively altruistic individuals ( > ). Hence, in such environments, altruism has a negative net incentive e¤ect on e¤ort (and hence leads to lower expected incomes). By contrast, in the less harsh environment, = 0:4, very high degrees of altruism ( close to 1) has a positive net incentive e¤ect on e¤ort. This is intuitively plausible, since in less harsh environments (those with higher ), the autarky e¤ort is low and hence so is the marginal disutility of e¤ort. The free-rider 
Altruism, the external environment and behavior
Does the non-monotonicity of the success probability p ( ) in the above example hold generally? The answer is a¢ rmative: the free-riding e¤ect dominates at low degrees of altruism while the empathy e¤ect dominates at high degrees of altruism. More precisely, the equilibrium success-probability decreases in when is at or just above^ ( ) and it increases in when is near 1.
Proposition 4 Consider the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p ; p ) of G . There is
This result is intuitively non-trivial. More altruistic individuals are, by de…nition, more concerned about the "external e¤ects"that their behavior has on others (here, their sibling), and hence the empathy e¤ect is stronger and free-riding e¤ect weaker on such an individual's behavior when that individual's degree of altruism is increased. However, since here both siblings'degrees of altruism are increased (from the same initial value and by the same marginal amount), the incentive to free-ride on the sibling's increased altruism is also stronger, so the net e¤ect is a priori ambiguous. The above proposition provides a clear-cut result that holds for a wide class of utility functions u and .
Next, let us brie ‡y consider the e¤ects of changes in the exogenous environment on the success probability. Clearly, an increase in the harshness of the environment by way of either an increase in the hazard probability , or a decrease in , the marginal return to e¤ort, leads to a decrease in the equilibrium success probability. 16 By contrast, an increase in output variability -a decrease in -leads to an increase in the equilibrium success probability;
a generalization of what we saw in the example in Figure 1 .
Proposition 5 Consider the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p ; p ) of G for a given value of 2 (0; 1). Increasing the harshness of the environment a¤ects p as follows: it is decreasing in , increasing in , and decreasing in .
Altruism and material utility
Still in the special case of a common level of altruism , we note that a sibling's expected material utility in the unique symmetric equilibrium of G may be written as
Using this expression it is straightforward to show that the common degree of altruism that leads to the highest expected material utility in equilibrium is full altruism:
The intuition is simple: fully altruistic individuals completely internalize the external e¤ect of their own behavior on their sibling's material utility. 17 Hence, siblings'incentives 16 This follows from (10) and (11), where is de…ned by (p) = v ' 1 (p) = . Hence, an increase in leads to a downward shift in and 0 .
17 Assuming that the siblings are fully altruistic is mathematically equivalent to assuming that they are sel…sh but make decisions collectively so as to maximize their joint expected material utility, as noted in Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) At …rst sight, it may come as a surprise that the outcome is ine¢ cient even when the siblings are purely sel…sh ( = 0). Why does not the independent strife of sel…sh individuals lead to a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome? The explanation is that both individuals'utility can be increased by keeping their common success probability at its equilibrium level, but having the rich sibling transfer a small amount to the poor sibling, whenever they end up with distinct outputs. Such consumption smoothing across states is bene…cial, ex ante, because of the assumed risk aversion (concavity in the utility from consumption). Hence, two sel…sh siblings would like to write such an (incomplete and mutual) insurance contract, also involving their e¤orts, had this been possible.
While very high levels of altruism thus are bene…cial, it is a non-trivial matter whether moderate levels of altruism are bene…cial in terms of the expected material utility. As was shown above, the success probability, and therefore also the expected output, declines as altruism increases from an initially moderate level. It turns out, however, that the expected material utility increases:
for all " 2 (0; ").
Evolutionarily robust family ties
A pair of siblings would fare best, in terms of their expected material utility, if they both were fully altruistic. But if sibling altruism is a trait that is inherited from parent to child (where inheritance could be cultural or genetic), is such a high degree of altruism robust against "mutations" towards lower degrees of altruism? As mentioned in the introduction,
18
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In this section we investigate whether "Hamilton's rule"holds up under the strategic sibling interaction modelled here, or if it can be appropriately generalized. In this exploration, we follow and extend somewhat Bergstrom's (1995 Bergstrom's ( , 2003 approach. More speci…cally, suppose that a child (genetically or culturally) inherits either its father's or its mother's degree of sibling altruism ("family values"), with equal probability for both events, and with statistical independence between siblings'altruism draws. 18 Thus, if the father's degree of altruism is f and the mother's is m 6 = f , then with probability 1=4 two siblings will both have altruism f , with the same probability they will both have altruism m , and with probability 1=2 one sibling will have altruism f and the other m . As in Bergstrom's (1995) model, mating is monogamous and mate selection is random. is inherited from the father, and the other from the mother. Whether a gene is expressed or not depends on whether it is recessive (two copies are needed for the gene to be expressed), or dominant (one copy is su¢ cient for the gene to be expressed). Bergstrom's (2003) analysis of games between relatives shows that the condition for a population carrying the same gene to resist the invasion by a mutant gene in the haploid case is the same as the condition for a population carrying the same recessive gene to resist the invasion by a dominant mutant gene in the diploid case.
19 See Remark 2 below concerning assortative mating.
20 Somewhat more generally, each pair may have an even number of children and they interact in pairs.
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matching of couples takes place as before and reproduction occurs. We call the "incumbent" degree of altruism evolutionarily robust against 0 if a child carrying the incumbent degree of altruism obtains, on average, a higher material utility than a child carrying the mutant degree, for all su¢ ciently small population shares of the "mutant" degree of altruism, 0 .
The "incumbent"degree is evolutionarily robust if this holds for every 0 6 = .
21
Let V ( ; ) denote the expected material utility to an individual with altruism whose sibling has altruism . In particular, V ( ; ) V ( ). As we will presently see, the condition for the above-mentioned incumbent degree of altruism to be evolutionarily robust against a mutant degree 0 6 = boils down to the following inequality:
Formally, we de…ne a degree of sibling altruism 2 [0; 1] to be evolutionarily robust if it meets (18) for all 0 6 = .
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To see that (18) indeed is necessary and su¢ cient for evolutionary robustness as informally de…ned above, note that the left-hand side, V ( ), approximates the expected material utility to a child with the incumbent degree of altruism, . For if the population share of mutants in the parent generation, " > 0, is close to zero, then with near certainty both parents of this child are -altruists, implying that the child's sibling almost surely also is an -altruist. Likewise, the expression on the right-hand side approximates the expected material utility to a child with the mutant degree of altruism, 0 . Because for " close to zero, such a child almost certainly has exactly one parent with the mutant degree of altruism (the probability that both parents are mutants is an order of magnitude smaller, " 2 , and the probability that none is, is zero). Therefore, with probability close to 1=2 this child's sibling 21 This notion is similar to that of an evolutionarily stable (pure or mixed) strategy in a …nite and symmetric two-player game; a population using such a strategy is robust against a small-scale invasion of any mutant strategy in the sense of earning a higher expected payo¤ in the post-entry population, see Maynard Smith (1982).
22 Bergstrom (1995 Bergstrom ( , 2003 derives a condition similar to (18) in a slightly di¤erent model, in which each individual is programmed to play a strategy in a symmetric two-player game. Bergstrom shows that for a sexual haploid species, a su¢ cient condition for a population consisting of x-strategists to be stable against a small invasion of y-strategists is
where (s; s 0 ) denotes the payo¤ to strategy s against strategy s 0 .
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has the incumbent degree of altruism, , and with the complementary probability the sibling has the mutant degree of altruism, 0 .
The process by which mutations appear in a population may a¤ect the extent to which the mutant degree of altruism di¤ers from the incumbent degree. In particular, "cultural drift" in values in a society may arguably lead to smaller di¤erences between incumbents and mutants, while immigration from another community or society may sometimes give rise to larger such di¤erences. The relevant evolutionary robustness criterion against "cultural drift"thus is a local version of the above de…nition. We will call a degree of altruism 2 [0; 1] locally evolutionarily robust if inequality (18) 
where V k is the partial derivative of V with respect to its k'th argument, for k = 1; 2.
If the incumbent degree of altruism in a society is 2 A, then D ( ) d is the marginal e¤ect of a slight increase in a mutant's degree of altruism, from to + d , on its child's expected material utility (achieved in the child's equilibrium play with its sibling) if the child inherits its mutant parent's degree of altruism. The …rst term is the e¤ect of an increase in the child's own altruism on his or her expected material utility, whereas the second term is the e¤ect of an increase in the child's sibling's altruism, multiplied by one half -the conditional probability that the sibling also is a mutant (in the limit as " ! 0). We will refer to the function D as the evolutionary drift function.
If D ( ) > 0, then the mutant child, if slightly more altruistic than the incumbent population, will outperform the incumbents'children in terms of expected material utility.
Likewise, if D ( ) < 0, then it is instead a mutant child who is slightly less altruistic than the 21
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incumbents that will outperform the incumbents'children. Hence, in order for an incumbent degree of altruism 2 A to be locally evolutionarily robust it is necessary that D ( ) = 0.
Let int (A) A be the set of interior points in A, that is, degrees of altruism such that V is continuously di¤erentiable at all points ( 0 ; 0 ) near ( ; ). For such degrees of altruism more can be said:
23
Proposition 8 A necessary condition for a degree of altruism 2 A to be locally evolutionarily robust is D ( ) = 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a degree of altruism 2 int (A) to be locally evolutionarily robust is (i)-(iii), where:
In other words: wherever the evolutionary drift function is well-de…ned, a necessary condition for local evolutionary robustness is that there be no drift, and, that there be upward (downard) drift at slightly lower (higher) altruism levels.
Remark 2 We have assumed random matching when couples form. Suppose, instead, that mutants have a tendency towards assortative mating: with probability 2 [0; 1] a given mutant will be selective, settle only for a match with another mutant, while with the complementary probability 1 , the mutant will be non-selective and have a random match. For a small population share " > 0 of mutants, the conditional probability that the sibling to a child with the mutant degree 0 of altruism will also have altruism 0 is then approximately equal to (1 ) =2 + (instead of 1=2). The evolutionary robustness condition (18) then generalizes to
and the drift function D becomes
This boils down to (19) in the limit case of fully random matching and gives D ( ) = V 1 ( ; ) + V 2 ( ; ) in the case of fully assortative matching.
23 This follows from the fact that local evolutionary robustness is equivalent with local strict maximization of the right-hand side of (18).
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Application to the present sibling interaction
When applied to the sibling interaction analyzed in sections 2-4 above, we …rst note that the expected equilibrium material utility to an individual with altruism and with a sibling with altruism is
where p : [0; 1] 2 ! (0; 1) is a function that to each pair of sibling altruism levels, ( ; ),
associates the equilibrium success probability of the -altruist. 24 Thus, if an individual has altruism and his or her sibling has altruism , then p ( ; ) is the individual's own success probability and p ( ; ) that of the sibling. Such a pair of success probabilities necessarily satisfy the system of equations (10). It follows from (22) that the set A, i.e., the degrees of altruism 2 [0; 1] such that V is di¤erentiable at the point ( ; ), consists of those degrees of altruism 2 [0; 1] that are such that p is di¤erentiable at ( ; ), and has partial derivatives, p 1 ( ; ) and p 2 ( ; ), with respect to the …rst and second argument of the function p . 25 Recall from proposition 3 that p 1 ( ; ) > 0 and p 2 ( ; ) < 0 whenever ; >^ ( ). Straight-forward calculations based on (22) and the envelope theorem lead to:
Proposition 9 For any 2 int (A):
where 24 We restrict attention to cases in which there is a unique equilibrium. Uniqueness holds, for instance, in the parametric example in Section 3.1 (for details, see Alger and Weibull, 2007) . The uniqueness assumption will, in fact, be used only when and are (in…nitesimally) close to each other. 25 See, e.g., Theorem 39.6 in Bartle (1976) . A su¢ cient condition for the di¤erentiability of V ,at a point ( ; ) 2 (0; 1) 2 , is that both partial derivatives, p 1 and p 2 , exist and are continuous on a neighborhood of ( ; ) (see, e.g., Theorem 39.9 in Bartle, 1976) .
23
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and
We are now in a position to derive a number of results. These results turn on whether or not^ ( ) < 1=2, that is, whether or not the critical degree of altruism for a transfer to occur is lower than Wright's coe¢ cient of relationship between the siblings. Writê
Then^ ( ) < 1=2 if and only if <^ .
We will say that the environment is gentle if >^ . In such an environment, the marginal utility at the low output is so close to the marginal utility at the high output level that siblings with altruism = 1=2 do not give any transfers to each other. Hence, their e¤orts are the same as in autarky. It follows that no degree of altruism 1=2 is evolutionarily locally robust in gentle climates, since a mutant sibling with altruism 0 near does not give any transfer either, and hence it obtains the same expected material utility as a sibling with the incumbent degree of altruism, .
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A more interesting, and arguably empirically more relevant case is when <^ . In such volatile environments, siblings with altruism 1=2 give voluntary transfers to each other in states when one is rich and the other poor. In the light of Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964a) , one might expect = 1=2 to then be the robust degree of kinship altruism. However, in the strategic interaction between siblings studied here, only lower degrees of altruism can be evolutionarily robust:
Proposition 10 Suppose that <^ . If 2 int (A) is locally evolutionarily robust, then
This result is due to the "strategic externality" that one sibling's altruism exerts on the other's choice of e¤ort: each sibling optimally adjusts its productive e¤ort not only to the exogenous environment but also to the anticipated transfer from the other sibling. To see this, suppose that both siblings' success probabilities were …xed, at some exogenously given level. What levels of sibling altruism would then be evolutionarily robust? Would
Hamilton's rule apply? An application of proposition 8 provides the answer: 26 In su¢ ciently gentle environments, mutants who are more altruistic than the incumbents and give transfers fare worse than the incumbents:
24
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Corollary 2 Suppose that <^ and that e¤orts are exogenously …xed and equal. Then the unique evolutionarily robust degree of sibling altruism is = 1=2.
However, in the present model, the success probabilities are endogenous -they are choosen by each sibling, and this choice depends, in general, on the siblings' degrees of altruism, as well as on the exogenous environment ( ; ; ), where is the ratio of the low to the high output, the marginal return to e¤ort, and the probability of a common negative shock. Hence, which degrees of sibling altruism are locally evolutionarily robust, if any, may depend on the environment. Given the analytical complexity of analyses of this and related questions, we resort to numerical simulations of the example in Section 4.1.
The external environment and altruism
Here we use the parametric example in Section 4.1 to explore how the environment may a¤ect the evolutionary robustness of di¤erent degrees of altruism, and thereby indirectly also e¤ort, income, and material welfare. We note that, logarithmic utility from consumption implies that^ = 1=2 (see equation (24)). In order to keep the number of parameters down, we henceforth set = 1. Figure 2 shows the graph of the evolutionary drift function D, with the common degree of altruism, , on the horizontal axis, for = 0 and = 2. The two graphs correspond to = 0:2 and = 0:3, respectively, where the …rst represents a harsher environment than the second. Each curve has a discontinuity at its -value (recall that^ ( ) = ). We see that the evolutionary drift, D ( ), is zero for all <^ ( ). At^ ( ) < < 1=2, D ( ) jumps up to a positive value, from which it declines continuously from positive to negative, as increases towards unity. According to Proposition 8, the intersection of the downsloping curve and the horziontal axis gives the unique locally evolutionary robust degree of sibling altruism. At lower (higher) degrees of sibling altruism there is upward (downward) evolutionary drift. We note that the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism is lower in the harsher environment.
A qualitatively similar e¤ect is found when output variability and the return to e¤ort are held …xed, and one instead varies the probability of a common negative shock, . 
environment.
We …nd a similar e¤ect when output variability and the probability of a common negative shock are held …xed: a harsher climate in the form of a lower return to e¤ort then leads to a lower robust degree of altruism (the …gure is omitted). Figure 4 shows the robust degree of altruism as a function of the environmental parameters and , with held constant (at zero). We see again how the evolutionary forces, as modelled here, select for lower degrees of altruism in harsher environments. This observation might, at …rst sight, appear counter-intuitive, since risk sharing would seem to have a larger survival value in harsher environments. While this may be true, it may also be that very altruistic populations are more vulnerable to the invasion by slightly less altruistic mutants the harsher is the environment. To see this, consider a relatively altruistic individual who has a more sel…sh sibling. The altruistic individual su¤ers doubly from the sel…shness of his or her sibling: the sel…sh sibling both makes a lower e¤ort (Proposition 3) and gives a lower transfer if need be. The altruistic individual is thus more likely to have to help his sibling out, is less likely to be helped out, and receives a lower transfer upon being helped out, than if his sibling had been like him. In harsher environments, both siblings make higher e¤orts (Proposition 5). Hence, a high degree of altruism may be more vulnerable to sel…sh mutants in harsher environments. Based on these simulations, we have calculated the equilibrium e¤ort and income as indirect functions of the environment ( ; ; ), by letting the degree of sibling altruism adapt to its unique evolutionarily robust value in each environment. Figure 5 shows e¤ort, x , as such an indirect function of the environment ( ; ; ), with = 0. For a given value of , siblings (with the corresponding evolutionarily robust degree of altruism) exert more work e¤ort in environments with higher output variability (lower ). In harsher environments in this sense, their family ties are weaker and they work harder. For an outside observer, it is thus as if those who live in milder climates are lazier than those who live in harsher climates, while in all these simulations all individuals actually have identical preferences concerning e¤ort (we have set the distaste for e¤ort, , equal to one in all simulations).
Max Weber (1904 Weber ( -1905 "nature"has already selected for individuals living in harsher climates.
The e¤ect of , the return to e¤ort, is not as clear-cut: for some values of , the equilibrium e¤ort, as an indirect function of the environment, is non-monotonic in . This is due to two opposing e¤ects, a sort of substitution e¤ect and a sort of income e¤ect. Ceteris paribus, an increase in has a positive incentive (substitution) e¤ect, but in the new and slightly milder climate, the robust level of altruism is a bit higher, and this has a disincentive (income) e¤ect on e¤ort; for all values of in Figure 5 , the equilibrium e¤ort level, given the associated robust degree of altruism (adapted to that climate), is lower than the autarky e¤ort level. Note that the same can be said in terms of technological innovations in a …xed environment: increased skill (higher , say, by means of new tools) may result in higher or lower e¤ort, once family values have adapted to the change in skills.
The higher e¤ort exerted in harsher environments is not always su¢ cient to yield higher average incomes. Indeed, when family ties adapt to the environment, the expected income may decrease as the environment becomes harsher, see …gure 6. Furthermore, even if the expected income sometimes is higher in harsher environments (with lower , say), and people thus are richer, they need not be "happier," their expected material utility may be lower. lower in harsher environments, this implies that the expected utility also is lower in harsher environments.
Our general analysis showed that increased sibling altruism has a non-monotonic e¤ect on e¤ort. This prompts the question whether e¤ort, and thus also the expected individual incomes after transfers, are higher or lower at the evolutionarily robust level of sibling altruism, than if both siblings had been sel…sh. In the environments in Figures 5 and 6 , transfers occur, from a rich sibling to a poor, at the corresponding evolutionarily robust degree of altruism. Figure 8 shows that in all the considered environments, the moral-hazard e¤ect dominates the empathy e¤ect: there is a positive di¤erence between Y 0 , the expected income in autarky, and Y , the expected income at the evolutionarily robust altruism. Furthermore, the absolute income reduction is higher in harsher climates, despite the lower level of altruism there. However, although altruism (at the evolutionarily robust level in the given environment) thus has a negative e¤ect on expected income, it does increase welfare -the expected material utility. As seen in Figure 9 , the di¤erence between V , the expected material utility at the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism, and V 0 , the expected material utility in autarky, is positive. Moreover, the absolute gain from altruism in material utility is larger in harsher climates, despite the lower level of altruism in such climates. their own altruism on other mutants, as is the case if is one half rather than zero, the marginal value of a mutation towards a slightly higher level of altruism is higher, and the evolutionarily robust degree of altruism is higher. To us, it is an open question whether or not there is assortative mating under gradual evolutionary drift in family values, so we feel more con…dent in predictions assuming little or no assortative mating.
Evidence on family ties
Our theoretical analysis focuses on the family as a potential source of mutual insurance, and on the mixed incentive e¤ect on individual e¤ort from such potential mutual help within the family. Here we summarize some of the evidence for such phenomena. We also discuss empirical studies by social scientists from di¤erent academic disciplines (economics, anthropology, sociology and history), studies suggesting that family ties are weaker in some societies than in others, and that such di¤erences may have predated the industrial revolution. We argue that the evidence is in line with the qualitative predictions of our model, namely, that family ties are stronger in less harsh environments.
First, there is evidence that transfers within the extended family are a source of insurance in countries where formal insurance is less well developed. 27 In a survey on private transfers between households, Cox and Jimenez (1990) conclude that in developing countries 20-90% of households receive (private) transfers from other households (mostly within the same extended family), which can represent up to 20% of the average household income. In the U.S. the corresponding …gures are 15% and 1%, respectively. Since the average income of donor households exceeds that of recipient households (Cox, Galasso and Jimenez, 2006) , these transfers appear to provide some insurance; see also Cox and Fafchamps (2008) . Several other studies, such as Udry (1990 ), Towsend (1994 , Miller and Paulson (2000) , and Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) , con…rm the hypothesis that insurance occurs within the extended 27 In 2003 the total value of insurance premia (life and non-life) as a percent of GDP was 12.48 in the US, Second, there is some evidence in that the degree of intra-family insurance a¤ects effort. Despite the previously strong emphasis in the theoretical literature on the possible moral-hazard e¤ect of intrafamily altruism (see Laferrère and Wol¤, 2006 , for a survey), there seems to be a limited number of empirical studies on this topic. Two of those studies suggest that mutual insurance within the extended family induces moral hazard. Using data on farmer output in Mali, Azam and Gubert (2005) establish that recipients of remittances from emigrated relatives in Mali decrease their e¤ort in response to an increase in remittances. Similarly, the analysis of Thai data by Miller and Paulson (1999) reveals that better insurance in the form of remittances leads to more gambling, both among those who are potential remitters, and among those who are likely to receive remittances. By contrast, the …ndings by Kohler and Hammel (2001) indicate that mutual insurance within the family may have a positive e¤ect on individuals'risk-reducing e¤ort. Using census data for Slavonia from 1698, Kohler and Hammel …nd that the number of di¤erent crops grown by a nuclear family tended to increase as the grain resources available within the extended family network (relative to the household's own land resources, and controlling for physical distance) increased. The authors were expecting the opposite e¤ect, namely that as a result of an increase in the amount and proximity of resources available for risk pooling within the extended family, a household would invest less in risk-reducing planting strategies. However, our results provide an explanation for this pattern: when a family expects to help another family out, the expected bene…t of the risk-reducing planting strategy is increased. The situation investigated by Azam and Gubert is perhaps closer to a model with one-sided altruism:
with remittances, essentially only the emigrant family member is in a position to help out the family that stayed in the home country. Hence, the only e¤ect of family altruism on the latter is the free-riding e¤ect, inducing lower e¤ort. By contrast, Kohler and Hammel studied households living in the same area, suggesting that any household could end up as a donor or a recipient of transfers.
Finally, there is evidence for geographic variations in the strength of family ties. U.S. data collected by Keefe et al (1979) indicates that second and third generation MexicanAmerican families have stronger kin ties than white Anglo families, even after controlling for variables such as education, occupation and the number of years of residence in the same city. Keefe (1984) further …nds that Mexican-Americans (people of Mexican descent but born in the U.S.) attach a larger value than Anglos to the physical presence of family members.
Using another data set, Gonzales (1998) Reher (1998) argues that one can measure the strength of a society's family ties by studying the age at which a child leaves his/her parents'home. In 1995, the average age of children living with their parents was 15 in Spain, 18 in Italy, 9 in the UK, 11 in the US, and 13 in Germany (Bentolila and Ichino, 2000) . Although these di¤erences may be a¤ected by di¤erences in economic opportunities, availability and cost of housing, and the extent of publicly provided insurance, there is evidence that preferences for cohabitation between parents are children vary among countries. Using U.S. data Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) analyzed how the rate of cohabitation between parents and their adult children responded to an exogenous increase in the parents'income: they found that the rate of cohabitation decreased as a result of the increase in the parents' income. Thus, cohabitation between parents and adult children is may be viewed as an inferior good in the U.S. But in other countries it is a normal good: using Italian data Manacorda and Moretti (2006) found that the rate of cohabitation between parents and their adult children increased as a result of an exogenous increase in the parents'income. Again, this is consistent with our predictions that family ties are stronger in less harsh climates.
Apart from Weber's suggestion that Protestantism has shattered the "fetters of the sib," the direct evidence from pre-industrial Europe is scarce. However, the little evidence there is appears to be consistent with our theoretical predictions. Hajnal (1982) reports data on servants in northwestern Europe during the 17th-19th centuries; approximately half of all youngsters served outside the parental home at some point, some leaving the parents at the age of 10. Thus, in 17th century England, "the unit of production was the husband and the wife and hired labor, not children" (Macfarlane, 1978) . By contrast, in southern and eastern Europe, hired labor was in the same period scarce and children would typically work on the 34 hal-00354241, version 1 -19 Jan 2009
parents'farm; several related couples and their children would then constitute an extended household. Finally, di¤erences in the legal systems may provide further insights into the strength of family ties. In England, parents had the right to bequeath or sell their assets to anyone. According to Macfarlane (1992) , this right may be traced back to the thirteenth century. By contrast, in France the heirs must be given the opportunity to purchase the assets (Macfarlane, 1992) .
Conclusion
Family ties are stronger in some parts of the world than in others and this may have been so for a long time. It seems that family ties grew weaker in northwestern Europe prior to the industrial revolution, as noted by Weber (1951) . This observation prompted us to ask …rst, how family ties a¤ect economic outcomes, and second, whether evolutionary forces may have shaped family ties di¤erently in di¤erent environments. With a preindustrial world in mind, we focused on the family's role as an insurance provider for its members. We modelled a family as a pair of mutually altruistic siblings, who may provide insurance to each other by way of voluntary transfers. In the literature on market insurance and moral hazard the risk-reducing e¤ort is decreasing in the extent of market insurance. By contrast, we found that the risk-reducing e¤ort is non-monotonic in the extent of family insurance. This nonmonotonicity was seen to be the result of two opposing e¤ects of altruism on e¤ort, the free-riding e¤ect and the empathy e¤ect. This theoretical …nding calls for more empirical studies on the e¤ect of family ties on e¤ort, of which there currently exists only a fairly small number (see Section 6).
In a preindustrial society, most people make their living as subsistence farmers and hunters, the output from which is determined jointly by their e¤orts and the environment in which they live. In our model we included three environmental factors: the marginal return to e¤ort, and local and global output variability, respectively. For a given level of intra-family altruism, we studied how these environment factors a¤ect individual family members'productive e¤orts. Our evolutionary analysis showed that neither very weak nor very strong family ties are robust against drift in the strength of family ties. As expected, full altruism -giving equal weight to a sibling's material welfare as to one's own -was seen to be nonrobust. If a few individuals in a large population would become slightly less altruistic toward their kin, these "mutants" would do better in terms of material welfare. More surprising,
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perhaps, is our …nding that this negative result also holds for the degree of altruism dictated by Wright's degree of relationship (1/2 for siblings, 1/8 for cousins etc.). If a few individuals in such a society would become slightly less altruistic towards their kin, then these individuals would in fact do better in terms of material utility. 28 We showed how this deviation from "Hamilton's rule" (Hamilton, 1964a) Also, extension to other types of transmission mechanisms between and within di¤erent generations, including endogeneous social norms, seem highly relevant to our understanding of the relationships between family values and economic develpoment; see Hauk and SaezMarti (2002) , Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Alger and Weibull (2008) for models of other inter-and intra-generational transmission mechanisms.
28 Likewise, we also show that full sel…shness is non-robust; since if a few individuals in such a society would become slightly altruistic they would do better in terms of material utility.
36
8 Appendix
Proposition 1
Let^ i : ! 0; y H be the function that de…nes, for every state ! 2 , the transfer that individual i would like to make to his or her sibling if the latter makes no transfer to i. Then
for j 6 = i, otherwise the optimal transfer^ i (!) is positive and equates i's marginal material utility to that of his sibling's when weighted by his own (i's) degree of altruism:
Since the material utility function is separable in consumption and e¤ort, e¤orts play no role Secondly, consider the two states ! in which
(for j 6 = i) and otherwise^ i (!) 2 (0; y i ) is the unique solution to the …rst-order condition
Suppose that y A > y B . It follows that then (^ A (!); 0) is a Nash equilibrium of G (!). If A B = 1, then this equilibrium is not unique, since also (^ A (!) + "; ") is a Nash equilibrium for all " 2 (0; y A ^ A (!)). Likewise, if y A < y B , then (0;^ B (!)) is a Nash equilibrium of G (!), and, if A B = 1, so are (" 0 ;^ B (!) + " 0 ) for all " 0 2 (0; y B ^ B (!)). This establishes the …rst and third claim in the lemma.
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As for the second claim, suppose that A B < 1 and consider the state ! in which
, then^ A (!) = 0 and (0; 0) is the uniqe Nash equilibrium
is necessary. Clearly, 0 = t A < t B is incompatible with equilibrium. It remains to show that also t A ; t B > 0 is incompatible with equilibrium. This can be established by way of proof by contradiction. Suppose, thus that (t A ; t B ) is a Nash equilibrium with t A ; t B > 0. Then the following two …rst-order conditions must both hold:
and hence
implying A B = 1, contradicting our hypothesis that A B < 1. The same reasoning applies to the state ! in which y A < y B . This establishes the second claim in the lemma.
Proposition 2
The …rst-order condition (6) implicitly de…nes the transfer t as a di¤erentiable function of . An application of the implicit function theorem gives
where, by strict concavity of u, the ratio on the right-hand side is a number in the open unit interval. Hence
Proposition 3
First, assume that A ; B <^ ( ). Then T ( A ) = T ( B ) = 0, and inspection of (11) shows that the equation system (10) is independent of A and B . Hence, its solution set is una¤ected by a marginal increase in any one or both of these parameters.
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Second, assume that condition (12) is met. Then the Jacobian of the equation system (10) is non-null, a condition, which, by the Inversion Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 41.8 in Bartle, 1976) , guarantees local uniqueness of the solution to (3). Suppose that i >^ ( ).
Step 1: First, we prove that, for each success probability of the other individual, p j , individual i's best response is strictly increasing in i . From (10) and noting that ( 0 ) 1 is an increasing function, this claim holds if
Using the …rst-order condition (6) for the transfer T ( i ), we obtain:
The expression on the right-hand side is positive, since i >^ ( ) implies T ( i ) > 0.
Step 2: Secondly, we prove that an increase in i does not lead to an increase in p j . For this claim, it is su¢ cient to show that
Using the …rst-order condition (6) for the transfer T ( j ), we obtain:
The expression on the right-hand side is negative for all j ^ ( ) and zero for all j <^ ( ).
Taken together, the two steps establish the claim in the proposition.
Proposition 4
Using equation (14), we obtain dp d
where
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As #^ ( ), at which point p is not di¤erentiable, the …rst two terms in (27) both tend to zero, while the third term is positive. Since it is to be subtracted, we conclude that dp =d < 0 for all >^ ( ) close to^ ( ). Likewise, as " 1, the third term tends to zero while the …rst two are positive. Hence, dp =d > 0 for all < 1 close to 1.
Proposition 5
where t is de…ned in (6) and K > 0 in (28). Since u is strictly increasing and concave, and jdt=d j < Y (see proof of proposition 2), dp =d < 0.
Proposition 6
We proceed in two steps. First, we characterize the socially optimal probability p and transfer t, to be given by the rich to the poor, under a Benthamite social welfare function. Secondly, we verify that these coincide with the equilibrium probabilities p A and p B , and transfers T ( A ) and T ( B ) if and only if A = B = 1.
Step 1: Consider a hypothetical social planner who chooses a probability p and transfer t so as to maximize the sum of the expected material utilities to each individual,
+2 (1 ) 
The necessary …rst-order condition for an interior solution for p is 
Moreover, for any value of p, the value of t that maximizes W (p; t) is such that both individuals end up with the same consumption in all states: Y t = Y + t.
Step 2 for the equilibrium outcome to coincide with the Benthamite optimum. It is also a su¢ cient condition, since the …rst-order condition that de…nes the equilibrium success probability p , equation (14), for T ( ) = (1 ) Y =2, coincides with (30), the necessary …rst-order condition for an interior social optimum, if and only if = 1.
Corollary 1
Given the symmetry of the unique equilibrium outcome, this is Pareto e¢ cient if and only if it maximizes the sum of both individuals' expected welfare, as de…ned in equation (4).
If each individual chooses a success probability p and gives a transfer t when rich and the other is poor, the mentioned sum is S(p; t) = (1 + )W (p; t), where W (p; t) is de…ned in (29). For any 2 [0; 1], S(p; t) is clearly strictly increasing in W (p; t). But, by proposition 6, the equilibrium expected material utility V coincides with the maximum value of W (p; t)
if and only if = 1.
Proposition 7
The claim in the proposition holds if
where V ( ; ) is de…ned in (22). Here V ( ; ) is the expected equilibrium material utility to an individual whose degree of altruism is and whose sibling's degree of altruism is . Likewise, p ( ; ) is the individual's own success probability and p ( ; ) that of the sibling. Such a pair of success probabilities necessarily satisfy the following system of …rst-order equations, a generalization of (10) 
Letting V 1 and V 2 denote the partial derivatives of V with respect to the …rst and second argument, respectively, and likewise, using p 1 and p 2 to denote the partial derivatives of p 41 hal-00354241, version 1 -19 Jan 2009
with respect to the …rst and second argument, respectively, we get:
( 1 ) Using this to replace 0 [p ( ; )] in (32) and (33), and simplifying yields Evaluating these two expressions at ( ; ) = ( ; ), and rearranging terms, we obtain Finally, using the …rst-order equation (6) that de…nes T ( ) for >^ ( ), and rearranging terms, we get:
This tends to a positive number as tends to^ ( ) from above, since the …rst two terms then tend to zero while the last term tends to a positive number.
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Proposition 9
Using the expressions in (34) and (35) for the partial derivatives V 1 and V 2 , we obtain from (19):
Recalling that T ( ) = 0 for all <^ ( ), that p 1 > 0 and p 2 < 0 for all >^ ( ), see Proposition 3, and that p 1 + p 2 < 0 for slightly above^ ( ), see Proposition 4, it is straightforward to show that the drift function D has the following properties:
1. D ( ) = 0 for all <^ ( ).
D is continuous at each 2 A.
3. lim #^ ( ) > 0 ,^ ( ) < 1=2, and lim #^ ( ) < 0 ,^ ( ) > 1=2.
4. D (1=2) < 0 ,^ ( ) < 1=2.
Corollary 2
Assume that <^ and that the success probabilties are exogeneously …xed and equal:
p A = p B = p 2 (0; 1). For every 2 int (A) we then have
where T 0 ( ) > 0 for all >^ ( ). Since T ( ) satis…es the …rst-order condition (6) for all such , we have, for every 2 int (A) exceeding^ ( ) < 1=2:
By Proposition 9, such an is locally evolutionarily robust if and only if = 1=2. Clearly no ^ ( ) is locally evolutionarily robust, since then -siblings give not transfers and an 0 -sibling does just as well, for any 0 < . From (22) we obtain that A = f 2 [0; 1] : 6 =^ ( )g.
In particular, (^ ( ) ; 1) int (A). Hence, = 1=2 is the only locally robust degree of altruism.
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